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DEFAMATION: EXTENSION OF THE "ACTUAL MALICE"
STANDARD TO PRIVATE LITIGANTS
Colson v. Stieg
89 II. 2d 205, 433 N.E.2d 246 (1982)
JAMES

R.

BAYER,

1984*

The success of first amendment challenges in the last two decades
to the common law tort of defamation has been described as

"[u]nquestionably the greatest victory won by defendants in the modem law of torts."' The tort of defamation, which provides a cause of
action to persons whose reputations are injured as a result of oral or
written statements made by others, 2 has been subject to several modifications as a result of these first amendment challenges. For a number
of centuries, plaintiffs could often recover without regard to whether
the defendant was at fault.3 However, the United States Supreme
Court has determined that the first amendment protects some defamatory speech, and, as a consequence, the Court has imposed a fault requirement on the tort. The Court has held that the degree of fault
4
required depends on the type of plaintiff involved.
In New York Times v. Sullivan, 5 the Supreme Court recognized
that there is a right to criticize public officials guaranteed by the first
amendment. To adequately protect this right, the Court held that the
* B.A., Political Science, DePauw University, 1981; Candidate for J.D., IIT/Chicago-Kent
College of Law, 1984. This article is dedicated to the memory of my grandfather, T.F. Bayer,
Editor-in-Chief of the Chicago-Kent Law Review in 1945.
1. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 115 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter referred to as PROSSER].
2. The most common definition of defamation is given by Dean Prosser: "Defamation is an
invasion of the interest in reputation and good name, by communication to others which tends to
diminish the esteem in which the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse feelings or opinions against
him." PROSSER, supra note 1,at § 115. The English common law defined libel as a publication
that "robs a man of his good name, which ought to be more precious than his life." Case de
Libellis Famosis, 77 Eng. Rep. 250 (1606).
3. The Star Chamber in the Libellis case set the precedent of strict liability which was continued in this country. Thus, under strict liability it made no difference whether the libel was true
or false. 77 Eng. Rep. at 251.
4. A public official suing for defamation must show that the statements were made with
knowing falsity or reckless disregard to their falsity. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964). A public figure must meet the same standard. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130 (1967). A private individual must show at least negligence. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974). See infra notes 38-65 and accompanying text.
5. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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defendant is not liable for any publication about a public official unless
the plaintiff can show that the defendant acted with "actual malice."
The Court defined "actual malice" as "knowledge that [the statement]
'6
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."
The Supreme Court later extended the New York Times rule to
include "public figures."' 7 Subsequent Court opinions led many to believe that any publication which concerned a matter of "general or
public interest" would be subject to the New York Times rule. 8 But the
Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. ,9 rejected this notion. Instead it
held that for private individuals, as long as states did not impose liability without fault, they could fashion their own standards of liability. 10
The Gertz Court voiced substantial criticism of the use of a general
or public interest test. Nevertheless, a few states adopted the test after
the Gertz decision." Illinois, however, refused to adopt the general or
public interest test in the 1975 case of Troman v. Wood. 12 But in the
recent case of Colson v. Stieg, 13 Illinois appears to have adopted this
test in the context of a defamation action brought by a professor at a
public university against an evaluation committee which denied him
tenure.
This case comment will analyze the Colson decision in light of the
constitutional standards required for defamation actions since the New
York Times decision. Illinois decisions applying these constitutional
requirements will be analyzed. It will be shown that the Illinois
Supreme Court reached an unwise result by imposing the actual malice
standard upon a private individual. This comment will conclude that
for defamation actions involving a private plaintiff, the defense of a
qualified privilege assures a proper balance between the interest of insuring free and uninhibited discussion and the interest in protecting the
individual's reputation.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:

AN OVERVIEW

At common law, there were at least four elements of a prima facie
6. Id. at 279-80.
7. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
8. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
9. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
10. Id. at 347.
11. See Aafco Heating and Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 Ind.
App. 671, 321 N.E.2d 580 (1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1975); Walker v. Colorado Springs
Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975).
12. Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975).
13. 89 I11.
2d 205, 433 N.E.2d 246 (1982).
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case for defamation. These elements were adopted by Illinois and have
remained essentially unchanged. In Illinois, the plaintiff is required to
prove: defamatory language on the part of the defendant;' 4 the defamatory language must be of or concerning the plaintiff;' 5 there must be a
publication of the statement to a third person who understood it; 6 and
7
there must be damage to the reputation of the plaintiff.'
A fifth element, fault on the defendant's part, has been substantially affected by United States Supreme Court decisions in the past
two decades which have found first amendment protection for some
defamatory speech. Prior to these cases, many states imposed strict liability upon defendants in defamation actions.' 8 For example, a defendant was held liable for statements he did not intend to make at all,
but which resulted from printing typographical errors,19 and where the
defendant did not intend to refer to the plaintiff or was ignorant of his
existence. 20 The notion of strict liability has been rejected by recent
2" involved deterSupreme Court decisions, with the type of plaintiff

mining the degree of fault required.
The impetus for finding that certain defamatory statements are
constitutionally protected was provided more than a hundred years
earlier by the establishment of a "qualified privilege." 22 In White v.
Nicholls ,23 a group of Georgetown residents wrote a letter to the President protesting political activities of the Georgetown collector of cus14. See, e.g., Zuckerman v. Sonnenschein, 62 Ill.
115 (1871). See also Symposium:. Libel and
Slanderin Illinois, 43 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1 (1966) [hereinafter referred to as Libelin Illinois]. The
elements of the prima facie case were adopted from the common law of England as first established in Case de Libellis Famosis, 77 Eng. Rep. 250 (1606). For further development of how the
common law developed in American case law, see Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of
Defamation, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 546 (1903).
15. See McLaughlin v. Fisher, 136 IU.111, 24 N.E. 60 (1890).
16. See Miller v. Johnson, 79 Il.58 (1875).
17. See Lorillard v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 65 I11.
App. 2d 65, 213 N.E.2d I (1st Dist. 1965).
Constitutional considerations may affect damage awards. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974), in which the Court held that a private plaintiffcould not recover punitive
damages unless he showed actual malice.
18. Many states adopted the notion of strict liability as advanced in the English case of Hulton & Co. v. Jones, 1910 A.C. 20. In Jones, the defendant newspaper published a story that
described the fact that one Artemus Jones was seen with a woman, who was not his wife. The
newspaper intended and believed the person in the story to be entirely fictitious, but a lawyer was
named Artemus Jones. The House of Lords affirmed the decision in plaintiffs favor, holding that
the defendant's innocence did not excuse it from liability.
19. In Upton v. Times-Democrat Publishing Co., 104 La. 141, 28 So. 970 (1900), a newspaper
was held liable for a typographical error which turned the intended statement of "cultured gentleman" into "colored gentleman."
20. See Switzer v. Anthony, 71 Colo. 291, 206 P. 391 (1922).
21. See supra note 4.
22. White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266 (1845).
23. Id.
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toms, Robert White, who had been appointed under a law of Congress.
The Court recognized that these statements were "privileged"-that is,
a person had a certain first amendment right to criticize public officials
in their official capacity. By adopting a qualified privilege, the Court in
effect shifted the burden of proof. In the usual libel case, the burden
was on the defendant to justify or excuse the publication. Under a
qualified privilege, the plaintiff would be required to show express malice 24-the plaintiff had to prove the statement false and that probable
25
cause to make the statement did not exist.
Although the privilege in Nicholls was limited to a petition to a
particular government official, the Court in dicta expanded the view
that privileged communications could include legislative and judicial
proceedings, communications made in discharge of a public or private
duty, and anything written by a master in giving the character of a
servant. 26 The Court also approved of a right to criticize candidates for
public office who voluntarily put themselves "in issue" so far as fitness
27
or qualifications were concerned.
While the Supreme Court decision in Nicholls was not binding on
28
state courts under the then existing interpretation of the Constitution,
24. Up until the decision of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the term
"malice" could connote some sense of ill will towards the plaintiff, although proof of ill will was
not necessary to prevail. For example, in Gilmer v. Eubank, 13 Ill. 271 (1851), the court said:
Malice is the gist of the action of slander. But the term malice has a two-fold signification. There is malice in law as well as malice m fact. In the former and legal sense it
signifies a wrongful act, intentionally done, without any justification or excuse. In the
latter and popular sense, it means ill-will towards a particular person; in other words, an
actual intention to injure or defame him. . . [TIhough evidence of malice may be given
to increase the damages, it [is not] essential ....
Id. at 274-75. For further discussion of malice, see Libel in Illinois, supra note 14, at 48. See also
C. LAWHORNE, THE SUPREME COURT AND LIBEL at 1-14 (1981) [hereinafter cited as LAWHORNE].
25. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266, 292 (1845).
26. Id. at 291.
27. Id. at 286-89. It is important to note that this case comment focuses only upon the traditional qualified privilege of fair comment and criticism. Because the plaintiff in the Colson case is
a professor at a public university, comment concerning his qualifications are in the "public interest." Statements concerning a private teacher's qualifications would be entitled to a qualified
privilege analogous to a former employer reporting to a prospective employer the misconduct of a
former employee. See, e.g., Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 41 Ill. 2d 345, 243 N.E. 2d 217
(1968). However, it is clear that the constitutional considerations affecting qualified privileges
concern only the privilege of fair comment and criticism which is the focus of this comment.
28. The Supreme Court decision in White was not binding on the states because of the decision in Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). In that case, the Court held that
the entire Bill of Rights was intended solely as a limitation on the exercise of power by the government of the United States, and was not applicable to the states. This meant that libel decisions
could not be appealed to the Supreme Court on the grounds that first amendment liberties had
been abridged. However, between the Civil War and the turn of the twentieth century, some type
of privilege was recognized in twenty-five of the twenty-eight jurisdictions in which appellate
court decisions in public official libel suits were recorded. See cases cited in C. LAWHORNE, DEFAMATION AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS at 87-110 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as PUBLIC OFFICIALS].
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it was often cited in state decisions. The far-reaching view of privilege
served as a catalyst for change in America's civil law of libel. States
began to extend some type of privilege to articles dealing with public
officials and candidates. The extent of the privilege varied from state to
state. The majority rule at that time limited the privilege to fair comment and criticism-misstatements of fact were not entitled to the privilege. 29 The minority extended the privilege to all nonmalicious
30
falsehoods about public officials.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court ruled that it had the right to review state restrictions on press freedom. In Gitlow v. New York, 3' the
Court "assumed" that freedom of speech and press "are among the
fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the
States."'32 Six years later, in Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 33 the
34
Court stated that its right of review was "no longer open to doubt."
The Court overruled a state law, stating it was unconstitutional for
Minnesota to place prior restraints on the publication of libels against
public officials.
By the early 1960's, the view allowing immunity for nonmalicious
misstatements of fact had gained wider acceptance. Nineteen states
granted a privilege for nonmalicious falsehoods about public officials,
35
and three other jurisdictions partially subscribed to such a privilege.
Twenty one states limited the libel-free privilege to fair comment and
29. See, e.g., Rearick v. Wilcox, 81 Ill. 77 (1876); Sweeney v. Baker, 13 W. Va. 158 (1878);
Bronson v. Bruce, 59 Mich. 467, 26 N.W. 671 (1886); Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., 154 Mass.
238, 28 N.E. 1 (1891); Upton v. Hume, 24 Or. 420, 33 P. 810 (1893); Fitzpatrick v. Daily States
Publishing Co., 48 La. Ann. 1116, 20 So. 173 (1896). By 1941, states limiting privilege to fair
comment and criticism were Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. See PUBLIC
OFFICIALS, supra note 28 at 129-42.

30. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Eno, 81 N.Y. 116 (1800); Palmer v. Concord, 48 N.H. 211 (1868);
Marks v. Baker, 28 Minn. 162, 9 N.W. 678 (1881); State v. Balch, 31 Kan. 465, 2 P. 609 (1884),
rev'd 171 P. 1153; Cotulla v. Kerr, 74 Tex. 89, 11 S.W. 1058 (1889). By 1941, states allowing
privilege for nonmalicious falsehood included: Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Iowa,
Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, and West Virginia. It was partially subscribed to by Delaware,
District of Columbia, Oklahoma, Texas, and Wyoming. See PUBLIC OFFICIALS, supra note 28, at
152-65. Thus, a publication that was not actionable in one state might be actionable in another.
This posed a problem for the press because newspapers and other publications often distributed
their publications in more than one state. Some commentators argued that the press, in order to
become responsible, needed uniform libel laws. See generally LAWHORNPE, supra note 24, at 26.
31. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
32. Id. at 666.
33. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
34. Id. at 707.
35. See supra note 30.
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criticism about officials. 3 6 This discord among jurisdictions led one author to conclude:
[T]he law of libel was being administered differently in different
parts of the nation. . . . Obviously there was a need for uniform administration and application of the laws of libel. But this could come
only with a declaration of one law for all states, and such a declara37
tion could come only from the United States Supreme Court.
That declaration of libel law uniformity came in the 1964 Supreme
Court decision of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 38 which determined
a constitutional minimum standard for all defamation actions brought
by public officials. The New York Times case arose out of a civil rights
demonstration in Montgomery, Alabama. The Times published a paid
advertisement, signed by a number of prominent individuals, which
complained of police misconduct in dealing with the demonstration.
Sullivan, the Montgomery police commissioner, brought an action for
libel, alleging that he was personally defamed as one of the persons
responsible for the misconduct. There were a few minor misstatements
of fact in the publication, only two of which in any way reflected on the
plaintiff.39 Alabama, however, was one of the states which limited the
privilege of "fair comment" to truthful statements of fact. 40 The jury
returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $500,000, which
41
was subsequently affirmed by the state supreme court.
The Supreme Court in New York Times reversed, 42 holding that
the first amendment requires a public official to prove that the publication was made with "actual malice." The Court defined actual malice
as "knowledge that [the statement] was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not." 43 Without such a rule, the Court said
"a pall of fear and timidity would be imposed upon those who would
give voice to public criticism" 44 and the media would engage in self
36. See supra note 29.
37. LAWHORNE, supra note 24, at 25.
38. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
39. It was said that the police had "ringed" the college campus. However, they only were
deployed near it in large numbers on three separate occasions. The advertisement also said that
Dr. Martin Luther King had been arrested seven times. He had only been arrested four times. Id.
at 259.
40. See supra note 29.
41. 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962).
42. 376 U.S. at 279-80. The New York Times case was the first time the Supreme Court had
ever granted certiorari to hear a libel case. For commentaries on the New York Times decision,
see Berney, Libel and the First Amendment-A New ConstitutionalPrivilege, 51 VA. L. REV. I
(1965); Merin, Libel and the Supreme Court, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371 (1969).
43. 376 U.S. at 280.
44. Id. at 269. It should be noted that the New York Times case was limited to statements
made about a public official in his official conduct. In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964),
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censorship. The New York Times decision, however, left lower courts
uncertain as to what persons were to be considered a public official and
whether "public figures," in contrast to "officials", also would be subject to the "actual malice" rule.
In 1966, the Court made its first, and most effective attempt, to
define a public official. In Rosenblatt v. Baer,45 the Court in setting a

minimum rule on what constitutes a public official stated, "[t]he 'public
official' designation applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to have substantial
responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental

affairs."

46

An important expansion of the New York Times ruling came in
1967 in the companion cases of Curtis PublishingCo. v. Butts andAssociatedPressv. Walker. 47 The Court found that cases brought by "pub48
lic figures" were also deserving of constitutional protection.
the constitutional privilege was extended to statements concerning private behavior that affected
officials' public conduct.
45. 383 U.S. 75 (1966). In Aosenblatt, a newspaper columnist had written an article which
could be interpreted to impute peculation and mismanagement to Baer, a county employee, who
was the supervisor of a county-owned skiing recreation area. The Supreme Court has since made
clear that merely being a public employee does not confer the status of a public official. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1978).
46. 383 U.S. at 85.
47. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
48. The Court agreed that actions brought by public figures were deserving of constitutional
protection, but members of the Court disagreed as to what the standard should be. The plurality
held that recovery could only be had upon "a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to
by responsible publishers." Id. at 155. Chief Justice Warren's concurrence and the four dissenters
argued that the actual malice standard should be used. Id. at 162.
The Court also gave no precise standard for defining a public figure, although it mentioned
some factors as notoriety or purposeful involvement in public affairs and an ability to influence
events. Id. at 155. Butts had been the athletic director at the University of Georgia. He claimed
he was libeled in a SaturdayEvening Post article which said that Butts had given all of Georgia's
football team's secret plays to the opposing Alabama coach. The companion case involved one
Walker, a retired army general. Walker had considerable political prominence in the South and
had appeared on many television and radio shows. Walker claimed he was libeled by an Associated Press article which stated that Walker had assumed an active role in race riots which occurred when the University of Mississippi was forced to integrate.
Since the Butts case, lower courts have grappled with the task of defining a public figure.
Lamented one court, "[diefining a public figure is like trying to nail a jelly fish to the wall."
Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976). It was not until the
case of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), that the Court tried to come up with a
workable definition. The Court found that a person may be deemed a public figure on one of two
grounds: (1) where he has achieved such pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a public
figure for all purposes and contexts; or (2) where he voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a
particular public controversy, and thereby becomes a public figure for that limited range of issues.
Id. at 351. Gertz also indicated that it might be possible for someone to become a public figure
through no personal action of his own, but considered such instances to be "exceedingly rare." Id.
at 345. Subsequent cases support this interpretation. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S.
448 (1976), where the Supreme Court found that a well known woman in the community involved
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Although the Butts decision was limited to public figures, the Court's
discussion focused in large part on the "public interest" of the defamatory statements. Thus, the belief was fostered that perhaps the determinative factor to be considered in applying the New York Times rule was
the public interest in the speech rather than the status of the individual.
This belief was strengthened by the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc. 49
In Rosenbloom, the Court upheld a lower federal court in requiring that a knowing or reckless falsehood be proved before libel damages could be obtained by a private individual who claimed he was

defamed in broadcasts discussing a police campaign to enforce obscenity laws.5 0 On its face, it appeared that the Supreme Court had extended the constitutional privilege of discussion which had been
previously limited to public officials and public figures to include libels
of private individuals that occurred in discussion of public issues.

However, this was the position taken by only three justices. Five sepa5

rate opinions were written and the dissent also included three justices. '
The plurality in Rosenbloom reasoned that an artificial barrier had
been created in earlier decisions between "public and private" persons,
which did not adequately take into consideration the public's interest in
in a highly publicized divorce proceeding, was not a public figure because she had not voluntarily
thrust herself into a public controversy. Justice Rehnquist noted: "She was compelled to go to
court by the State in order to obtain legal release from the bonds of matrimony." Id. at 454. See
also Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157
(1979).
49. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
50. Rosenbloom, a distributor of nudist magazines in Philadelphia, was arrested along with
other newsstand operators on charges of selling obscene materials. A radio station owned by
Metromedia reporting on the arrests called the persons "smut merchants," "girlie-book peddlers,"
and said that the books confiscated were "obscene." When Rosenbloom was later acquitted of
obscenity charges, along with a ruling that the magazines were not obscene, he filed a libel action
in federal district court. He claimed that his acquittal proved the books were not obscene, the
statements made by the radio were false, and that the statements characterizing him as a "smut
merchant" and "girlie-book peddler" were false. The jury returned a verdict for Rosenbloom in
the amount of $28,000 in general damages and $750,000 in punitive damages. The judge reduced
the punitive damages to $250,000. 289 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Pa. 1968). The trial verdict was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 415 F.2d 892 (3rd Cir. 1969). The court
ruled the broadcasts concerned a matter of public interest which required the New York Times
standard to be used. Id. at 896. It held Rosenbloom failed to meet this standard. Id. at 898. The
fact that Rosenbloom was not a public figure was not of "decisive importance" because the court
ruled that the first amendment protects discussion of public issues. Id. at 896. It was this ruling
which the Supreme Court's plurality opinion upheld.
51. Justice Brennan's lead opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun.
Justice Black and Justice White concurred. Justices Harlan, Marshall, and Stewart dissented.
Justice Douglas did not join in the opinion because he had been under great criticism for his
liberal opinions in obscenity cases which was a peripheral issue in Rosenbloom. But he would
have undoubtedly joined Justice Black in his view that the first amendment did not allow any
recovery in libel actions against the news media. See LAWHORNE, supra note 24, at 76.
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the speech involved. Thus, the Court said the time had come "forthrightly to announce that the determinant whether the First Amendment
applies to state libel actions is whether the utterance involved concerns
an issue of public or general concern .... -52
In the three-year period following the Rosenbloom decision, seventeen states and six circuits of the United States Courts of Appeals followed the plurality opinion as the controlling law. 53 As the
Rosenbloom dissent predicted, almost everything published was con54
sidered by the lower courts as matters of public or general interest,
requiring the New York Times standard.
The fragile alignments of the Rosenbloom case soon shattered in
the case of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. -5The Court rejected the Rosenbloom public interest test and replaced it with a dual standard. For
suits brought by public persons, the Court required use of the actual
malice standard. For suits brought by private individuals, the states
were free to define their own standard of liability, as long as they did
56
not impose liability without fault.
The events surrounding the Gertz case involved a publication by
Robert Welch, founder of the John Birch Society and a long-time campaigner against communism. His magazine, American Opinion, carried
an article which allegedly defamed Chicago attorney Elmer Gertz. The
article told about the trial and conviction of a Chicago policeman who
had shot and killed a Chicago youth. While Gertz had not been involved in the prosecution, the youth's family had retained Gertz in a
civil action against the policeman and he had represented the youth's
family at the coroner's inquest. The magazine article described Gertz
as a "Leninist" and a "Communist-fronter" who was an architect of the
"frame-up" against the policeman. 57 This information contained serious inaccuracies, and the managing editor of the magazine made no
effort to verify the charges. The trial judge set aside a libel verdict on
the basis that a public issue was involved and that Gertz failed to prove
52. 403 U.S. at 44.
53. See cases cited in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 377 n.10 (1974).
54. Within a year after the Rosenbloom decision, federal and state appellate courts applied
the public interest standard to stories about individuals involved in electronic eavesdropping, gun
fights, organized crime, sports, backpacking overseas, pollution control, quality of restaurant food,
service on private bus systems, suspension from school, sale of liquor to minors, divorce proceedings, published books, housing evictions, jail escapees, political campaign work, and credit bureau
practices. See cases cited in LAWHORNE, supra note 24, at 79 n. 39.
55. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
56. Id. at 347.
57. Id. at 326.
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actual malice. 58 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit considered the case shortly after the Rosenbloom decision. In
light of Rosenbloom, the court determined that because of the "public
issue" being discussed, Gertz would have to prove a knowing or reck59
less falsehood, which he failed to do.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Gertz case. The
Court noted that the principal issue was whether a publisher of defamatory falsehoods could claim a constitutional privilege against liability
where the publication concerned a private individual. 60 The question,
according to the Court, was how to balance the first amendment requirements with the right of the states, under the ninth and tenth
amendments, to protect the reputations of private individuals. 6 1 The
Court reaffirmed the "actual malice" standard adopted in New York
Times for public officials and public figures. Nevertheless, the Court
noted that the "actual malice" standard resulted in a "substantial
abridgement of the state law right to compensate for wrongful hurt to
one's reputation." 62 Such an abridgement would not be appropriate in
private person libel cases according to the Court.
The Court's rationale in Gertz was that private individuals are
more deserving of recovery than public officials or public figures since
private persons do not seek public scrutiny and do not relinquish interest in the protection of their good names. The Court also feared the
inability of private people to have access to the media to combat defamatory falsehoods. The Court also was concerned that a "public issue" test would force judges to decide on an ad hoc basis what
publications were matters of "public or general" interest. 6 3 Thus, the
Court concluded that "so long as they do not impose liability without
fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of
liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual." 64 The case was remanded for a new trial
65
under these standards.
After the Gertz decision, two states decided to adopt the use of the
general or public interest test to determine the use of the actual malice
58. 322 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. I11. 1970).
59. 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972).
60. 418 U.S. at 332.
61. Id. at 341.
62. Id. at 342-43.
63. Id. at 346.
64. Id. at 347.
65. After fourteen years in the courts, Elmer Gertz finally received a judgment in the amount
of $400,000. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1982).
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67
standard. 66 Some states adopted the use of a gross negligence test.
private individuals to prove
But a majority of state courts only require
68
publisher.
the
of
part
the
on
negligence

ILLINOIS DEFAMATION LAW

Since the development of defamation law was left largely to the
states and the constitutional protections afforded to certain defamation
actions are only minimum standards, the development of Illinois defamation law must also be considered. Before the New York Times decision, Illinois, like every other state, recognized a "qualified privilege"
to criticize public officials and candidates. 69 However, Illinois was one
and critof the many states which limited the privilege to fair comment
70
fact.
of
misstatements
any
for
allow
not
did
icism and
After the New York Times decision, the Illinois courts required a
public official to prove actual malice before he could recover. 7' However, in 1969, the Illinois Supreme Court extended even more protection to publishers of defamatory statements by applying the New York
Times standard to all matters of "public or general concern." 72 The
court, in Farnsworth v. Tribune Co. ,73 held that the United States
Supreme Court cases of Butts and Rosenbloom established that matters
66. See Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 Ind.
App. 671, 321 N.E.2d 580 (1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Walker v. Colorado Springs
Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975).
67. See Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 341
N.E.2d 569 (1975). See also Ryder v. Time, Inc., 3 MEDIA L. REP. 1170 (1977).
68. See Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 114 Ariz. 309, 560 P.2d 1216 (1977); Corbett v.
Register Publishing Co., 33 Conn. Supp. 4, 356 A.2d 472 (1975); Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So.2d
172 (Fla. 1974), rev'don other grounds, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 234 Ga.
765, 218 S.E.2d 54 (1975); Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 56 Hawaii 522, 543 P.2d 1356
(1975); Troman v. Wood, 62 IIl. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975); Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co.,
216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975); Wilson v. Capital City Press, 315 So.2d 393 (La. App. 1975);
Forrest v. Lynch, 347 So.2d 1255 (La. App. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 971 (1978); Jacron Sales
Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976); Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367
Mass. 849, 330 N.E.2d 161 (1975); Walters v. Sanford Herald, Inc., 31 N.C. App. 233, 228 S.E.2d
766 (1976); Thomas H. Maloney & Sons, Inc. v. E. W. Scripps Co., 43 Ohio App. 2d 105, 334
N.E.2d 494 (1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 883 (1975); Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85
(Okla. 1976); Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1123 (1976); Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976); Phillips
v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 2 MEDIA L. REP. 2201 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1977) (decision of a single
trial judge).
405, 123 N.E. 587 (1919). For
69. See, e.g., Ogren v. Rockford Star Printing Co., 288 Ill.
further discussion of the "qualified privilege" of fair comment and criticism Libel in Illinois, supra
75-79.
note 14, at
77 (1876).
70. See, e.g., Rearick v. Wilcox, 81 Ill.
App. 2d 402, 199 N.E.2d 73 (1st Dist. 1964).
71. See Proesel v. Myers Publishing Co., 48 Ill.
72. Farnsworth v. Tribune Co., 43 II. 2d 286, 253 N.E.2d 408 (1969).
73. Id. It is interesting to note that Elmer Gertz, the plaintiff in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974), represented the plaintiff.
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of public interest were entitled to constitutional protection. 74 The
plaintiff in Farnsworth was an osteopathic physician who claimed she
was libeled
when the Chicago Tribune called her, among other things, a
"quack. '"7 5 The court held that qualifications of the medical profession
were an area of critical public concern and clearly qualified as a subject
"about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the mem' 76
bers of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.
After the Gertz decision, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the
Farnsworth rationale in Troman v. Wood.77 The court held that the
status of the plaintiff was the determinative factor-if a private plaintiff
was involved, the negligence standard would now be used. 78 In
Troman, a newspaper article was published about a series of burglaries
and other criminal activities by a gang of youths. One edition carried a
photograph of a house which bore the caption: "Home of Mrs. Mary
'79
Troman. Thomas Troman testified that he is a member of the gang."
The complaint alleged that the article and the picture taken together,
were understood by readers as meaning that the plaintiff's home served
as a headquarters for the gang, and that the plaintiff was in some man80
ner associated with the gang.
In rejecting the general or public interest test, the court recognized
that Illinois has a strong interest in protecting an individual's reputation.8" The court also noted that the media itself plays a large role in
determining what is a matter of public interest. Finally, the court
stated that since recklessness did not include the failure to investigate,
82
this rule would actually serve to discourage investigations.
However, in Colson v. Stieg,83 the court appears to have readopted
the test which places reliance on the subject matter of the publication
instead of the status of the plaintiff.

74.
75.
76.
(1967)).
77.

Id. at 291, 253 N.E.2d at 411.
Id. at 287, 253 N.E.2d at 409.
Id. at 291, 253 N.E.2d at 411 (quoting Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130
62 Ill. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975).

78. Id.

An extensive discussion of Troman can be found in J.BARRON & C. DIENES, HAND(1979) [hereinafter referred to as BARRON],

BOOK OF FREE SPEECH AND FREE PRESS

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

62 Ill.
2d at 188, 340 N.E.2d at 294.
Id.
Id. at 194, 340 N.E.2d at 297.
Id.
89 Ill.
2d 205, 433 N.E.2d 246 (1982).

NOTES AND COMMENTS
COLSON

V STIEG

Facts of the Case
The plaintiff, John Colson, had been employed by Northern Illinois University as an assistant professor in the Department of Library
Science since 1975.84 He had accepted the position with the expectation that he would be granted tenure. However, his request for promotion and tenure status was denied.8 5
The plaintiff brought suit against Lewis Stieg, chairman of the Library Science Department, charging that the defendant had published
certain defamatory remarks about the plaintiff's performance of his duties. The complaint alleged that the defendant made two defamatory
statements attacking the plaintiff in his profession, which were therefore alleged to be slanderous per se.86 The statements allegedly made
by the defendant were:
I have information I cannot divulge which reflects adversely on
John's performance as a teacher.
I have counseled John many times about his teaching and the documents which would prove the counseling are8 7missing from the
department files under suspicious circumstances.
The first statement was allegedly made at a meeting of the Department of Library Personnel Committee assembled for the purpose of
evaluating Colson's performance pursuant to his application for tenure.
The second was made before the University Council Personnel Committee assembled to consider plaintiff's appeal from the Department's
recommendation that he be denied tenure.88 Neither meeting involved
more than four faculty members.8 9
The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for fail84. Id. at 207, 433 N.E.2d at 247.
85. Id. at 207-08, 433 N.E.2d at 247.
86. Slanderperse constitutes spoken defamation where an injury to reputation is presumed
without proof of special damages. There are four common law categories of slander per se:
(1) words imputing to a person the commission of a criminal offense; (2) words which
impute that the party is infected with some contagious disease .. . ; (3) defamatory
words which impute to the party unfitness to perform the duties of an office or employment . . . or the want of integrity in the discharge of the duties . . .; (4) defamatory
words which prejudice such party in his or her profession or trade . ...
Ward v. Forest Preserve Dist. of Winnebago County, 13 Ill. App. 2d 257, 262, 141 N.E.2d 753, 755
(2d Dist. 1957). The statements about Colson clearly imputed unfitness to perform his employment. For further discussion of slander per se, see Libel in Illinois, supra note 14, at 12-24.
87. 89 I11. 2d at 208, 433 N.E.2d at 247.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 212, 433 N.E.2d at 249.
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ure to state a cause of action. 90 The appellate court 9' held that the first
statement was slanderous per se, incapable of an innocent construction,9 2 and actionable despite a qualified privilege because the plaintiff
had properly alleged malice. The second statement, the court held, was
capable of innocent construction and was not actionable. Since the
complaint had stated a cause of action, the trial court's order was reversed in part and the case remanded for further proceedings. The Illinois Supreme Court granted leave to appeal. 9 3 The essential question
according to the court was the degree of protection which should be
afforded a faculty evaluation committee meeting. To answer this question, the court felt compelled to review the law of defamation since the
New York Times ruling.
The Court's Reasoning
Justice Ryan, 94 writing for the majority, first determined that the
statements made about a public university professor were traditionally
entitled to a qualified privilege. 95 This privilege was based on the common law privilege which allowed "fair comment" on public officials,
public figures and on matters of public concern. 96 The court independently recognized that a large area of the law concerning privileges had
been changed by first amendment constitutional considerations. 97 It
90. The plaintiff's amended complaint was one long rambling sentence which stated: "Said
statement was made by Defendant knowing it to be false, without reasonable grounds for believing it to be true, maliciously, wilfully, intentionally and without reasonable justification or excuse
with the intention of destroying Plaintiff's personal and professional reputation .. ." Id. at 215,
433 N.E.2d at 250. The trial court dismissed the action because the bare allegations of knowledge
of falsity without underlying supporting facts were not legally sufficient. However, both the Illinois appellate court and the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the complaint had stated a
cause of action. Although the complaint was hardly "a model," the supreme court noted that the
Code of Civil Procedure requires that complaints be "liberally construed, to the end that controversies may be speedily and finally determined according to the substantive rights of the parties."
ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 110, par. 4 (1981). Thus, the court concluded that the allegations of actual
malice ("knowing it to be false") were enough to state a cause of action. 89 11. 2d at 215-16, 433
N.E.2d at 250-51. See also Coursey v. Greater Niles Township Publishing Corp., 40 Ill. 2d 257,
239 N.E.2d 837 (1968).
91. 86 Ill. App. 3d 993, 408 N.E.2d 431 (2d Dist. 1980).
92. For discussion of the innocent construction rule, see infra notes 134-41 and accompanying text. The illogical results created by the innocent construction rule are aptly illustrated by the
second statement of the defendant, which the court found was capable of an innocent construction. The statement clearly implies that Colson had something to do with the disappearance of
documents which reflected adversely on him, yet the court held it was not actionable.
93. 73 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).
94. Justices Goldenhersch, Underwood and Ward joined the majority opinion.
95. See supra notes 23-36 and accompanying text.
96. 89 Ill. 2d at 209-10, 433 N.E.2d at 248.
97. Id. at 209, 433 N.E.2d at 247-48. It is interesting to note that the court's discussion and
decision concerning constitutional protections was made independently. Neither party nor the
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emphasized that the New York Times holding had replaced the common law qualified privilege of fair comment and criticism. Citing with
approval Dean Prosser's statement that there is no reason that the constitutional privilege of New York Times should not be extended to all
matters of public concern,98 the court stated that it had now "extended
the holding of New York Times in that direction." 9 9
The court relied primarily on its 1969 decision of Farnsworth v.
Tribune Co. ,10o where the court had clearly held that matters of public
interest triggered the constitutional privilege of New York Times. The
court also focused on the Supreme Court's decision in Gertz. The court
said that Gertz emphasized the New York Times holding that in order
to insure the breathing space essential to the exercise of the constitutional freedoms of speech and press, the burden of proof shifted. The
court said the burden was no longer on the defendant to prove the
truthfulness of the utterance. Instead, the burden was now on the
plaintiff to prove actual malice on the part of the defendant. Without
this shift in the burden of proof, the defendant would engage in selfcensorship because he would have to prove the truth of the statement. 10 1 The court held that the avoidance of this self-censorship was
the basis of the New York Times and Gertz decisions.
The court next turned to the facts of the particular case. It stated
that the primary consideration should be the importance of the subject
matter to the speakers and hearers. 0 2 The committee was discussing
the merits of a professor to decide whether he should be granted tenure
at a public university. Clearly a matter of substantial importance, the
need for free and uninhibited discussion without self-censorship were
"compelling reasons for applying the constitutional first amendment
protections of New York Times .... "103
The court also briefly flirted with the notion that the plaintiff
might be a public official or a public figure, noting that in some cases
teachers have been held to be such for purposes of applying the New
York Times standard. 1°4 The court determined that it did not need to
trial or appellate courts raised the issue of the use of the New York Times rule. Neither party even
raised the issue in their briefs to the Illinois Supreme Court.
98. Id. at 210, 433 N.E.2d at 248 (citing PROSSER, supra note 1, at § 118).
99. Id.
100. 43 Ill. 2d 286, 253 N.E.2d 408 (1969). See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
101. 89 I1. 2d at 211, 433 N.E.2d at 248.
102. Id. at 212, 433 N.E.2d at 249.
103. Id. at 213, 433 N.E.2d at 249.
104. Id. (citing Johnson v. Bd. of Junior College Dist. No. 508, 31 111. App. 3d 270, 334 N.E.2d
442 (1st Dist. 1975); Kapiloff v. Dunn, 27 Md. App. 514, 343 A.2d 251 (1975), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 907 (1976)). In Johnson and Kapiloff the plaintiffs became involved in a public controversy
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decide this issue since the facts justified the conclusion that "this case
clearly qualified under the Butts test as a subject about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of the committee
to cope with the issues confronting them."' 105 The court concluded that
the self-censorship which would result without the New York Times
standard would be a "severe limitation on the ability of the committee
to perform its assigned task of evaluating performances of the personnel of the university."l°6
The court's final task was to dissuade the fears raised in Gertz
about the use of a general or public interest test to determine the New
York Times privilege. Gertz expressed concern that one reason to base
the actual malice standard on the status of the individual was that public officials and public figures have a greater access to the media to
combat defamatory falsehoods. The facts in Colson, said the court,
were distinguishable. Professor Colson had an opportunity to appeal
his denial to the University Council Personnel Committee. Therefore,
he did have a way to combat the defamatory falsehoods. 0 7 The court
also noted that since few people knew of the publication, the injury to
the plaintiff was minor. Thus, the court would weigh two factors to
determine whether the publication was entitled to constitutional protection: the extent of the publication and the importance of the infor10 8
mation to the recipients.
Concurring Opinion
Three justices concurred 0 9 with the majority's conclusion that the
complaint stated a cause of action, but disagreed with the majority's
opinion that the New York Times standard of actual malice should
apply.
This highly critical concurrence, written by Justice Clark, faulted
the majority for extending the New York Times rule to a defamation
action between two private individuals. It noted that Gertz explicitly
held that in suits by private figures, a standard of liability less rigorous
than New York Times would not impermissibly abridge freedom of
on campus and therefore became a public figure. However, Professor Colson did not do anything
to invite attention to himself or thrust himself into a public controversy. To consider him a public
figure would clearly be erroneous.
105. 89 I11.
2d at 213, 433 N.E.2d at 249.
106. Id.
107. There is no indication that this committee considered statements made during the evaluation meeting. To the contrary, most of these appeals usually reconsider the merits of the professor.
108. 89 11.2d at 213, 433 N.E.2d at 249.
109. Justices Clark, Moran and Simon specially concurred.
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speech and press. 0
The concurrence stated that the plaintiff's status was the key factor
in determining whether the standard should apply. On the basis of status, the plaintiff was clearly a private individual-not a public figure.
He had not injected himself into a particular public controversy nor
had he achieved a pervasive fame or notoriety."' Nor was Colson a
"public official" simply because he was a public employee." 12 Therefore, there were no constitutional reasons for applying the New York
Times rule.
The concurrence also chided the majority for its failure to apply
the traditional use of a qualified privilege to this situation. It noted that
the plaintiff had conceded before the appellate court that the defendant
did have a qualified privilege." 3 To overcome this privilege, the plaintiff would have to prove that the defendant did not believe the truth of
the defamatory matter or that he had no reasonable grounds to believe
it to be true." 4 This common law rule adequately accommodated the
competing interests. There would still be room for free and uninhibited discussion, but the state would still preserve its legitimate interest
in protecting the reputation of the private individual. The concurrence
stated that it did not think that "the United States Supreme Court's
decision in this area render or were intended to render [the privilege]
5
nugatory."" 1
Of further concern to the concurrence was the fact that the majority had not limited its decision to matters of public or general interest.
The concurrence stated that the majority placed primary reliance on
the importance of the subject matter of the communication to the
speakers and hearers." 6 This went beyond any previously recognized
limits. The concurrence concluded that no opinion of the United States
Supreme Court or of the Illinois Supreme Court provided a precedent
for the majority's rationale, and that the common law privilege pro110. 89 Ill. 2d at 217, 433 N.E. 251 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347
(1974)).
111. See supra notes 47-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of what constitutes a "public figure."
112. 89 Ill. 2d at 218, 433 N.E.2d at 252 (citing Hutchison v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979)).
For a discussion of public officials, see supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
113. 89 I11.2d at 219, 433 N.E.2d at 252.
114. Id. It should be noted that in defamation actions, under a qualified privilege or a negligence standard, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had no reasonable grounds to believe
that the statements were true. See Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 41111. 2d 345, 243 N.E.2d
217 (1968) (qualified privilege); Troman v. Wood, 62 IU. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975)
(negligence).
115. 89 111.2d at 219, 433 N.E.2d at 252.
116. Id. at 220, 433 N.E.2d at 253.
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vided an adequate balance between the need for uninhibited discussion
of public issues and the legitimate state interest in protecting the repu7
tation of a private individual."
ANALYSIS

Despite the Gertz Court's clear preference for the use of a negligence standard for private individuals, it recognized that states must be
permitted the discretion to balance the needs of its citizens against the
needs of the press. It allowed the states to define their own standard of
liability as long as they did not impose liability without fault. The Colson decision is therefore judicially correct. But the court relies on outdated cases, ignores more recent precedent, and fails to recognize
interests protected by the Illinois Constitution.
First, the Colson decision cannot be read as specifically endorsing
the use of a general or public interest test. The court itself makes a
feeble attempt to limit the decision, implying that if there was widespread publication to persons, the plaintiff might not have had sufficient access to means of rebuttal and then the actual malice standard
might not have been used." l8 Two Illinois appellate cases also have
determined that Colson should be limited to its particular facts." 19
However, the reasoning of the court and the cases of Farnsworth,Butts
and Rosenbloom, upon which the court relies, all would support the
general or public interest test. In fact, the Colson decision may go even
farther. The court relies on the importance of the subject matter of the
publication. Conceivably, there could be a publication that was of
great importance to the speakers and hearers, but that was not in the
public interest. Clearly, this should not be entitled to constitutional
protection.
The Colson opinion virtually ignores the interest of the individual
in protecting his reputation. The Supreme Court in Gertz recognized
this interest. The Gertz Court held that a private individual is more
20
deserving of recovery because he has not invited attention to himself.'
117. Id. at 219-20, 433 N.E.2d at 252-53.
118. 89 Ill.
2d at 212, 433 N.E.2d at 249.
119. See American Pet Motels, Inc. v. Chicago Veterinary Medical Ass'n, 106 I11.App. 3d 626,
435 N.E.2d 1297 (Ist Dist. 1982). This case concerned statements made about the plaintiffs pet
motel at a meeting of veterinarians and in a newsletter. The court stated that "[wie are not convinced that the court in Colson intended to elevate all qualified privilege to constitutional stature. . . . We see no reason to extend the constitutional privilege beyond the limits drawn in
Colson." Id. at 631-32, 435 N.E.2d at 1301-02. See also Davis v. Keystone Printing Service, Inc.,
11I Ill. App. 3d 427, 444 N.E.2d 253 (2d Dist. 1982).
120. 418 U.S. at 346.
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Illinois has always recognized that an individual has a strong interest in
protecting his reputation. In fact, reputation is explicitly protected by
the Illinois Constitution.' 2' One commentary states that the Illinois attitude "has from the beginning been one of protection of the plaintiff
politician at the expense of the freedom of expression of the defendant
newspaper and at the expense of the right of the public to be fully
22
informed."1
The Colson court also ignores its own clearly established precedent. The 1975 decision of Troman v. Wood explicitly overruled Farnsworth, yet Colson places primary reliance on Farnsworth and does not
even mention Troman. Failure to rely on Troman is certainly understandable since it would be damaging to the majority's ultimate conclusion, but ignoring precedent does not make for sound judicial decisionmaking.
Problems of the Colson Approach
The Colson approach will bring about many of the uncertainties
associated with the general or public interest test. The biggest problem
is that the general or public interest test depends on a case by case
approach. The Gertz case recognized that forcing judges to decide on
an ad hoc basis what was a matter of general or public interest would
be an "unwise" approach. 123 Illinois judges will again have to make
this determination. Indeed, determining the importance of the subject
matter of the publication may allow for more subjectivity and provides
the lower courts with little guidance.
The general or public interest test is also subject to manipulation
by the publishers of the statements. As the Troman court stated,
"[w]hether a matter is one of public interest. . . depends to some de124
gree on whether the media themselves have chosen to make it one."'
These same concerns are raised by the Colson decision.
The Colson standard may actually dissuade the publishers of statements from making prior investigations as to the veracity of their information. In Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 25 the Supreme Court
121. For example, the Illinois Constitution of 1818 provided that fundamental rights include
"enjoying and defending liberty, and acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation." ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. VIII, § 1.The individual is entitled to a remedy "for all injuries
and wrongs that he may receive in his person, property or character." Id. at § 12. The most
current constitution substitutes the word "character" for "reputation." ILL. CONST., art. I, § 12.
122. Libel in Illinois, supra note 14, at 97.
123. 418 U.S. at 343.
124. 62 Ill.
2d at 196, 340 N.E.2d at 298.
125. 389 U.S. 81 (1967). The actual malice standard is an exceedingly difficult one to meet.
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stated that failure to make a prior investigation did not even constitute
proof sufficient to present the question of a knowing or reckless falsehood to the jury. 26 Troman recognized that this would dissuade publishers from making investigations, since by doing so they would
generate evidence for a plaintiff to prove actual malice. 27 The
Supreme Court has recognized that the need for uninhibited discussion
of public officials and public figures was so great that the evils that
might occur by lack of investigation would have to be endured. But the
Court in Gertz determined that discussion of private individuals was
not deserving of this extra constitutional protection.' 28 Yet Colson
once again gives this extra protection to defendants.
Does New York Times and its Progeny Only Protect the Media?
29
Many commentators and at least one Supreme Court Justice
have taken the view that the New York Times case and its progeny
extend only to the media. Since Stieg was not a member of the media,
his statements would not be constitutionally protected. All of the cases
the Supreme Court has decided in the defamation area have dealt with
the media. The intent of the Founders, the Court has said, was to insure a free press which would advance "truth, science, morality and
arts in general."' 130 The sweeping statements in New York Times have
become considerably more focused in the Gertz and Firestone decisions. Increasingly, the emphasis is placed on the free press guarantee
and the need of the media for protection from self-censorship. The
The plaintiff must show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant knew of the falsity or
was reckless, which is based primarily on the defendant's subjective state of mind. Therefore,
recovery is rare. See BARRON, supra note 78 at § 6.26. See also Comment, The Expanding Constitutional Protection for the News Media from Liabiliyfor Defamation: Predictability and the New
Synthesis, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1547, 1560-61 (1972).
126. 389 U.S. at 84-85.
127. 62 I11.
2d at 196, 340 N.E.2d 298.
128. 418 U.S. at 347.
129. BARRON, supra note 78 at § 6.18. The position that there is a special prerogative of the
press under the freedom of the press guarantee was publicly supported by Supreme Court Justice
Potter Stewart. He has said that the freedom of the press clause is a "structural provision of the
constitution" which extends a special protection to the media as an institution. Stewart, Or of the
Press, 26 HASTINGS L. J. 631, 633 (1975). Justice Stewart says that the inclusion of a separate
press clause in the first amendment demands that the free speech and free press cases be treated
separately. The fact that the press and media are constitutionally privileged in some circumstances does not necessarily mean that a non-media defendant would be similarly privileged. It
should be noted that this view has not yet been endorsed by the Supreme Court and was stated in
a speech rather than in a Supreme Court opinion. They are merely added as support for the
position that the Court appears to have taken. For further discussion, see Note, Potter Stewart.:
An Analysis of His Views On the Press As Fourth Estate 59 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 157 (1982).
130. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. at 147 (quoting "Letter to the Inhabitants of
Quebec," I Journals of Continental Congress, at 108).
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opinions are replete with references to the "press," the "media," and
"broadcasting."' 3 1 Gertz said the issue was "whether a newspaper or
broadcaster" could claim the New York Times privilege in an action
brought by a private plaintiff. 132 One author concludes:
It is possible that the Gertz emphasis on press interests was inadvertent or responsive only to the particular fact pattern involved in that
case. This, however, seems unlikely. . . . The Gertz opinion comes
at a time when there is increasing inquiry into the respective roles of
the free speech and free press guarantees, including statements by
members of the Supreme
133 Court. It seems unlikely that this went unnoticed by the Court.
A distinction also may be made between libel and slander. Again,
all the Court decisions have dealt with libel. The Court is very careful
to use the word libel instead of the generic term of defamation. Certainly the broadness of the communications media was unforeseen by
the founders. The extent of the injury from a libelous statement is
likely to be much greater, thus perhaps, justifying a distinction between
libel and slander for extending constitutional protection.
The QualfiedPrivilege
The biggest failure of the Colson court, however, is its improper
interpretation of a qualified privilege. In the court's haste to avoid selfcensorship, it ignores the fact that self-censorship should not occur
under a qualified privilege. The Colson court feared that if the defendant had to prove the truth of what he said, he "would be reluctant to
freely express himself on a controversial subject."' 34 But this fear is
unfounded because the defendant does not have to prove the truth of
the statement when acting under a qualified privilege. The defendant
must only prove that he had reasonable grounds to believe the subject
matter to be true. 35 This standard, as the court recognized in Troman,
will strike a proper balance between the need for a free speech and
press versus the protection of an individual's reputation.
131. For example, the Court in Gertz stated: "[This standard] recognizes the strength of the
legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals . . . yet shields the press and the
broadcast media from the rigors of strict liability." 418 U.S. at 348 (emphasis added). See also
Nimmer, Is Freedom of the Press 4 Redundancy: What Does It Add to Freedom of Speech? 26
HASTINGS L. J. 639, 649-50 (1975).
132. 418 U.S. at 332.
133. BARRON, supra note 78.
134. 89 Ill. 2d at 211, 433 N.E.2d at 248.
135. See Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 41 11. 2d 345, 243 N.E.2d 217 (1968). Under
the negligence standard of Troman, the plaintiff will have to show the same thing--that the defendant had no reasonable grounds to believe the statement to be true. 62 I11. 2d at 197, 340
N.E.2d at 298.

CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW

Balancing the Colson Decision
A short time after Colson, the Illinois Supreme Court decided the
case of Chapski v. Copley Press.136 This case concerned the merits of
the "innocent construction rule." This rule, used only in Illinois, required that a court hearing a libel case to interpret words as not
libelous if the words could be interpreted that way. 137 The rule made
' 38
Illinois a "haven for journalists."'
But there has been substantial criticism of the innocent construction rule since its inception twenty years ago. Under the rule, news
organizations were given wide latitude. However, it also "encouraged
[the media] to drop hints, which were practically libel-proof, rather
than make outright accusations, which are not." 139 The rule resulted in
what one commentator called "remarkable judicial acrobatics," as
courts strain to "see no evil" in statements seemingly defamatory on
their face. 14
The court in Chapski recognized the inequities of the rule and
modified it. The new rule requires a reasonableness standard-if
words may reasonably be interpreted to be innocent, they are non-actionable.' 4 1 The Chapski court recognized that "modification of the innocent construction rule would better serve to protect the individual's
interest in vindicating his good name and reputation, while allowing
the first amendment guarantees that 'breathing space' essential to their
42
fruitful exercise."'
With the Colson and Chapski decisions, the Illinois Supreme
Court has given with one hand, and taken away with the other. The
Colson decision gives more protection to free speech and press, while
the Chapski decision gives more protection to the plaintiff. The Colson
decision is somewhat more defensible than the old innocent construction rule was. After all, the Supreme Court gave explicit approval to a
state to define its own standard of liability, as long as it did not impose
liability without fault. And Illinois is not the only state to require a
136. 92 Ill.
2d 344, 442 N.E.2d 195 (1982).
137. The innocent construction rule was established in John v. Tribune Co., 24 I11. 2d 437, 181
N.E.2d 105 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 877 (1962), where the court stated: "[T]he article is to be
read as a whole and the words given their natural and obvious meaning, and requires that words
allegedly libelous that are capable of being read innocently must be so read and declared nonactionable as a matter of law." Id. at 442, 181 N.E.2d at 108.
138. Chicago Lawyer, Dec. 1982, at 5, col. 1.
139. Id.
140. Lovell, The "Reception" of Defamation by the Common Law, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1051,
1065 (1962).
141. 92 IUI.2d at 351-52, 442 N.E.2d at 198-99.
142. Id.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

plaintiff to prove actual malice if the published matter is in the public
interest.1 43 But the Colson decision is still unwarranted. As Chapski
serves to illustrate, Illinois still recognizes a strong interest in protecting
an individual's reputation. If the innocent construction rule can be
modified to preserve this right, the court should be content to continue
to apply the standard advanced and abundantly justified by the
Troman decision. The Colson court's failure to adequately consider
the interest of protecting the individual's reputation leads to this anomalous result.
CONCLUSION

The status of Illinois defamation law is unclear after the Colson
decision. A private individual who brings a defamation suit should try
to limit Colson to its particular facts. If a media defendant is involved
or if there is widespread publication, the plaintiff should argue that
Troman should be the applicable standard. The private individual
should stress Illinois' explicit legislative and judicial recognition of the
need to effectively protect private reputational interests. Finally, the
plaintiff should emphasize the weaknesses of the case by case approach
of Colson. Hopefully, these arguments will gain a favorable reception.

143. See supra note 11.
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